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The Moral Standing of Animals: 
Towards a Psychology of 
Speciesism 
 
Human relationships with non-human 
animals are complex. Some animals are 
treasured as pets, receive our love and 
devotion and are provided with a diet and 
quality of health care better even than 
some humans in the developing world. 
Other animals, in contrast, are factory 
farmed and slaughtered so that their 
bodies can provide the meat we share 
with our pets. Yet other animals are 
regarded as experimental subjects, sources 
of entertainment, or industrial equipment. 
Any observer who had not been socialized 
to view this as normal would likely be 
struck by this inconsistency of moral 
worth attributed to animals in human 
societies. In this paper, we attempt to 
understand this paradoxical treatment by 
importing the philosophical concept of 
speciesism into a social-psychological 
examination of human-animal 
relationships.  
 
The Philosophy of Speciesism 
Philosophers have long noted the 
inconsistency in our regard for animals, 
but it is only in recent decades that the 
systematic consideration of human-animal 
relations has really flourished and entered 
the public domain. Our relationships with 
animals have been called “speciesist” — a 
term introduced and popularized in the 
1970s and specifically intended to draw a 
parallel with other forms of unjustified 
discrimination, such as racism and sexism 
(Horta, 2010; Ryder, 2006, Singer, 1975; 
1979; Singer & Mason, 2007). Speciesism, 
in the philosophical literature, refers to the 
assignment of different inherent moral 
status based solely on an individual's 
species membership. As implicit in the 
definition of speciesism and its very 
name, speciesism can be understood in 
both a descriptive and a normative sense. 
Descriptively, speciesism is a concept that 
explains how people behave; namely that 
they do, as a matter of fact, assign moral 
worth to individuals on the basis of 
species membership, such that people can 
therefore be accurately described as 
having speciesist attitudes. Normatively, 
much work on speciesism is rooted in the 
claim that people should not assign 
different moral values to individuals 
based solely on their species membership, 
with analogies made with treating people 
differently solely based upon their race 
(racism) or gender (sexism). This paper is 
concerned with speciesism as a 
psychological phenomenon and, 
therefore, in a descriptive sense.  
Speciesism manifests itself in the near-
universal belief that humans are 
intrinsically more valuable than 
individuals of other species. It also 
manifests itself in the belief that 
differential treatment of species that have 
comparable mental and emotional 
capabilities, such as pigs and dogs, is 
morally justifiable. These manifestations 
of speciesism are ubiquitous, 
underpinning practices such as the mass 
factory farming of animals for food, the 
use of animals for human entertainment 
in circuses, and legal systems that view 
animals as property and deny them basic 
rights such as the right to bodily integrity. 
For example, we treat dogs with special 
moral status while simultaneously factory 
farming and eating pigs — despite the fact 
that dogs and pigs have similar mental 
and emotional capabilities (Mendl, Held, 
& Byrne, 2010). Such manifestations of 
speciesism are, descriptively, familiar to 
all, even if one might deny there is 
anything, normatively, wrong with this. 
Speciesism—like racism and sexism—is 
observed throughout history and across 
cultures. Just like ethnic prejudice is 
observed in all societies but is directed 
against different groups based on local 
traditions and history, speciesism appears 
evident across cultures but is expressed 
differently across the world (see Amiot & 
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Bastian, 2015). Consider dogs and cats: in 
China they are considered food and thus 
akin to other animals like pigs, but in 
Western societies they are seen as ‘one of 
the family’ and thus have a much higher 
status than pigs (Simoons, 1990). Or 
consider cows: routine fare on the dinner 
plate in many Western countries, but 
forbidden from being eaten and revered 
as sacred animals in Hindu societies. 
These culturally determined 
manifestations of speciesism occur not just 
across cultures but also across time. 
Horses were once routinely consumed in 
Western countries for centuries, but now 
horsemeat consumption has substantially 
declined and the perceived moral status of 
horses has increased (Gade, 1976).  
At this point, one might ask whether it 
is really speciesism that best explains why 
we treat people and animals differently 
based on their species (for philosophical 
criticism of speciesism as a concept see 
Diamond, 1978; Kagan, 2016, Williams, 
2009). Just as it has been argued in history 
that unequal treatment of races is morally 
justified because members of different 
races (supposedly) differ in their 
intelligence or physical capabilities, might 
it not be species membership per se that 
results in differential treatment, but rather 
other traits that happen to correlate with 
species membership? Three of the most 
common objections to the utility of  the 
speciesism concept, raised by 
philosophers and laypeople alike, are that 
rather than reflecting a speciesist bias, 
humans devalue animals because: a) 
animals are less cognitively able than 
humans; b) animals, unlike humans, 
cannot be moral agents (i.e. they cannot 
reciprocate in moral interactions and 
cannot be held morally or legally 
responsible for their actions); or c) animals 
are less sentient (i.e. able to feel and 
experience things such as suffering) than 
humans. 
Were any of the above the true cause 
of human treatment of animals, 
speciesism would be a redundant concept. 
And yet, careful analysis suggests that this 
is not the case. When each of the above 
reasons is investigated more fully, they 
are shown to be incomplete explanations 
(see, for example, Horta, 2010).  
a) First, the argument from cognitive 
abilities (i.e. that humans devalue 
animals because they are less 
cognitively able than humans) fails 
to account for why people place 
different moral value on different 
animals that have similar cognitive 
abilities. Pigs, for example, have 
higher cognitive abilities than 
dogs, and even pass a weak 
version of the mirror test, 
indicating some level of self-
awareness (Broom, Sena & 
Moynihan, 2009). It cannot, 
therefore, simply be cognitive 
abilities that determine treatment, 
because otherwise pigs would be 
treated as equal, and maybe even 
superior, to dogs. Of course, some 
people might morally value pigs 
less than dogs because they 
incorrectly assume that pigs are 
less intelligent than they actually 
are, which might be driven by 
motivated reasoning (e.g. Bastian 
et al., 2012). But such incorrect 
assumptions and/or motivated 
reasoning cannot explain clear 
cases of people valuing certain 
individuals less despite being fully 
aware that they are equally or 
more intelligent than others (for 
example, chimpanzees vs. severely 
mentally disabled humans, see 
point b). 
b) Second, the arguments from both 
cognitive abilities and moral 
agency (i.e. humans devalue 
animals because animals, unlike 
humans, cannot be moral agents) 
are countered with the example of 
severely mentally disabled 
humans. Humans grant equal 
moral status to severely mentally 
disabled humans and healthy 
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individuals despite their lack of 
cognitive and reciprocal abilities—
they may even grant such 
individuals enhanced moral status 
in light of their vulnerability. 
Moreover, it seems that most 
people would place less moral 
value on a chimpanzee than on a 
human with very severe mental 
disabilities even in cases where 
they know that the chimpanzee 
has higher cognitive abilities than 
said human. Neither cognitive 
abilities nor the potential for 
reciprocal morality, then, seem to 
accurately account for the way we 
treat members of different species, 
because otherwise we should 
afford greater weight to the 
treatment of intelligent animals 
over severely disabled humans. 
c) Third, the argument from 
sentience (i.e. animals do not feel 
and experience things such as 
suffering) fails because empirical 
data has shown that many animals 
— and in particular vertebrate, like 
pigs, dogs, and cows — are 
capable of suffering to an extent 
analogous to humans (Low et al., 
2012). It is possible, however, that 
people systematically 
underappreciate the level of 
sentience in many animals. 
Moreover, even in the absence of 
this overwhelming scientific data, 
we can observe that people do not 
typically doubt the sentience of, 
for example, human infants — 
despite the fact that the behavior 
of infants offers weaker evidence 
for sentience than the behavior of, 
for example, an average adult 
chimpanzee.  
 
Given these arguments, the standard 
objections to the utility of the 
philosophical concept of speciesism are 
unconvincing. People do seem to assign 
worth to different species solely on 
species membership. And even if one 
disagrees on just how unconvincing these 
criticisms are, it seems clear that they are 
not strong enough to halt discussion of 
speciesism in its tracks. From a 
philosophical perspective, the paradoxical 
treatment of animals can be usefully, and 
informatively, described as speciesist. 
And indeed this is where speciesism has 
most often been used—in philosophy. But 
could speciesism also be a useful 
psychological construct, shedding deeper 
light on the way that humans think about 
animals? We argue that it can. 
 
The Psychology of Speciesism  
In this paper, we present speciesism as 
a psychological construct, suitable for 
psychological investigation. Specifically, 
we are interested in the empirical truth of 
the psychological claims implicit in the 
philosophical discussion of speciesism: 
first, the primary claim that people assign 
moral worth to individuals on the basis of 
species membership alone; and second, 
the claim that speciesism is a form of 
prejudice analogous to other prejudicial 
attitudes. Philosophers have debated 
these claims, but relatively little empirical 
work has been conducted to test whether 
these claims are, as a matter of fact, true. 
Do people, in actuality, assign moral 
worth to individuals on the basic of 
species membership; and are these 
speciesist attitudes connected to other 
prejudicial attitudes? By rigorously 
examining this, it becomes possible to 
bring the concept of speciesism into the 
study of intergroup relations and 
prejudice more generally, thus providing 
new insights and directions for research 
for both topics.  
Our preliminary aim, upon which all 
later aims depend, was (Aim I) to develop 
a reliable and valid scale to measure 
speciesism as a psychological construct 
(Studies 1 and 2). Once this was achieved, 
we aimed to look at (Aim II) the extent to 
which speciesism can psychologically be 
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considered a form of a prejudice (Study 3), 
by testing whether (Aim IIa) speciesism 
correlates with other forms of prejudice, 
and whether (Aim IIb) speciesism, like 
other forms of prejudice, is driven by 
socio-ideological factors such as social 
dominance orientation that maintain other 
forms of intergroup conflict. To the extent 
that speciesism is a form of prejudice it 
should be correlated with prototypical 
examples of prejudice and be driven by 
the same kind of processes that drive 
other prejudices. Moreover, we aimed to 
explore the relationship between 
speciesism with empathic concern and 
actively open-minded thinking (Aim IIc). 
Finally, we aimed to look at (Aim III) 
whether speciesism predicts behavior, 
such as the degree of help directed 
towards individuals of different species or 
the likelihood of choosing certain food 
products over others (Studies 4 and 5).  
To what extent is it reasonable, on 
empirical grounds, to view speciesism as a 
form of prejudice? It is here that 
psychology has a real and important role 
to play. If it can be shown that speciesism 
is psychologically related to other forms 
of prejudice, the philosophical case for it 
can be strengthened. One typical 
definition of prejudice is that it refers to 
“any attitude, emotion, or behavior 
toward members of a group, which 
directly or indirectly implies some 
negativity or antipathy toward that 
group” (Brown, 2010, p. 7). Speciesism 
seems to fit that definition as it involves 
negative beliefs, emotions, and behavior 
directed towards others based on species 
membership. Most people believe that 
pigs matter less than dogs (attitude), feel 
disgust towards rats but love towards cats 
(emotion), and accordingly treat pigs and 
rats much worse than they treat dogs and 
cats (behavior). Moreover, in addition to 
fitting the definition of prejudice, we aim 
to show that speciesism shares properties 
and underlying psychological 
mechanisms with other phenomena 
referred to as prejudice.  
Previous Research 
As noted above, surprisingly little 
psychological research has focused on the 
discrimination against animals (for one of 
the first papers, see Plous, 1993). There 
are, however, some previous and more 
recent studies on human-animal relations, 
their underlying attitudes, mechanisms 
and resulting practices that suggest it is in 
fact useful to consider speciesism in terms 
of intergroup bias, prejudice, and 
discrimination.  
The Social Dominance Human-Animal 
Relations Model (SD-HARM) 
The first connection between 
speciesism and intergroup bias comes in 
the form of social dominance orientation 
(SDO: Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & 
Malle, 1994). People differ in how much 
they support or oppose group-based 
dominance and inequality amongst social 
groups, and this variance can be referred 
to as differences in social dominance 
orientation. Differences in SDO predict 
prejudicial attitudes towards a variety of 
human social groups, including ethnic 
minorities, housewives, people with 
mental health difficulties, and people who 
are obese or perceived as unattractive (e.g. 
Duckitt & Sibley, 2007). Critically for a 
discussion of speciesism, SDO also relates 
to how people feel about inequality 
between humans and animals. Recent 
studies suggest that people who believe in 
the superiority of humans over animals 
also believe in the superiority of some 
humans over others (Costello & Hodson, 
2009; Dhont & Hodson, 2014; Dhont, 
Hodson, Costello & MacInnis, 2014). 
Accordingly, Dhohnt, Hodson and Leite 
(2016) have proposed the Social 
Dominance Human-Animal Relations 
Model (SD-HARM) whereby the same 
socio-ideological beliefs that legitimize 
hierarchies amongst human groups also 
seem to legitimize hierarchies of humans 
over animals. Such findings suggest that it 
would be fruitful to consider speciesism in 
terms of intergroup conflict, if both 
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speciesism and other forms of prejudice 
depend on similar psychological beliefs. 
Dehumanization and the Interspecies 
Model of Prejudice (ISMP) 
The second connection between 
speciesism and intergroup conflict comes 
from work on dehumanization, and 
specifically research suggesting that 
intergroup dehumanization is linked with 
beliefs in the superiority of humans over 
animals. Dehumanization is the 
psychological process by which other 
people are seen as less “human” and 
therefore not worthy of full moral 
concern, and is a critical part of intergroup 
conflict (Haslam, 2006). The language of 
dehumanization, such as referring to 
black people as “apes”, Jews as “rats” and 
women as “bitches”, works to strip the 
victim of moral worth, as it is assumed 
that actual apes, rats, and dogs could not 
merit full moral consideration. Two 
distinct accounts have been proposed to 
explain the relationship between 
dehumanization and attitudes towards 
animals.  
One the one hand, it has been 
suggested that just as some people 
dehumanize human out-groups by 
reducing attribution of mental states, they 
also de-mentalize animal out-groups. 
Specifically, the denial of animals’ 
capability to suffer, known as de-
mentalization, can reduce moral concern 
for animals (Bastian et al., 2012; Kozak, 
Marsh, & Wegner, 2006). Indeed, research 
shows that a person’s moral concern for 
animals is closely related to how much 
they believe animals can suffer (Waytz, 
Gray, Epley, & Wegner, 2010).  
On the other hand, according to the 
Interspecies Model of Prejudice (ISMP: 
Costello & Hodson, 2014), belief in an 
insurmountable human–animal divide is 
the foundation for out-group 
dehumanization. That is, dehumanization 
is made possible by the moral gulf 
between human and animals: By likening 
out-group members to ‘inferior’ animals, 
people who endorse social dominance are 
able to remove their victims from the 
‘human’ sphere of moral concern and 
place them in the ‘animal’ sphere where 
no moral consideration is necessary. The 
existence of the human-animal gulf 
therefore functions to facilitate prejudice 
and discrimination between groups of 
humans as well as between humans and 
animals. In support of this theory, it was 
demonstrated that when similarities 
between animals and humans are pointed 
out not only speciesism is reduced but 
also moral concern for marginalized 
human out-groups is increased (Bastian, 
Loughnan, Costello, & Hodson, 2012). 
The Meat Paradox and Carnism 
A related emerging field of research 
has started to investigate the psychology 
surrounding practices of eating animals 
(Loughnan & Bastian, 2014). Most people 
do not want to hurt animals, yet continue 
to eat meat. This widespread phenomenon 
has been referred to as the ‘meat paradox’ 
(Loughnan et al., 2010; Loughnan, Bastian, 
& Haslam, 2014). Both active (motivated 
reasoning) and passive (e.g. social norms) 
dissonance avoidance can account for the 
meat paradox (Bastian & Loughan, 2017). 
A main driver of the meat paradox is 
de-mentalization (discussed above). 
People tend to de-mentalize animals they 
classify as food (e.g. Bastian et al., 2012) 
and judge animals that are categorized as 
food (e.g. pigs, cows, chickens) as having 
lower capability to suffer than animals 
that are typically not categorized as food 
(e.g. cats, dogs, horses; Bilewicz, 
Michalak, & Kamińska, 2016; Bratanova, 
Loughnan, & Bastian, 2011). Moreover, 
people are more likely to de-mentalize 
animals if they have recently eaten meat 
(Loughnan, Haslam, & Bastian, 2010) or if 
they anticipate eating meat soon (Bastian 
et al., 2012; Bastian & Loughnan, 2016). 
It has been argued that meat 
consumption is legitimized by a set of 
ideological beliefs referred to as ‘carnism’ 
(Joy, 2011; Monteiro, Pfeiler, Patterson & 
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Milburn, 2017). Eating meat, for example, 
is justified on the basis of it being natural, 
normal, necessary, and nice (“The 4 Ns”; 
Piazza et al., 2015). Furthermore, carnism 
shows in the justification of killing 
animals for food purposes (Monteiro et 
al., 2017). Conceptually, carnism is a 
specific subset of speciesist beliefs and 
practices, namely those related to the 
categorization of certain animals as food. 
Psychologically, we would expect carnism 
and speciesism to be to some extent 
distinct due to the fact that many people 
care about animals in general while at the 
same time defending meat consumption 
and its practices (i.e. meat paradox). 
Overall, however, it seems likely that the 
two are not just conceptually but also 
psychologically strongly linked. 
Measuring Speciesism 
To study speciesism, we need a 
convenient way of measuring speciesist 
attitudes. There are currently two 
established scales that attempt to capture 
general attitudes towards animals: 
Herzog, Betchart, and Pittman’s (1991) 
Animal Attitude Scale and Wuensch, 
Jenkins, and Poteat’s (2002) Animal Rights 
Scale. Both scales capture important 
aspects of people’s attitudes towards 
animals. For many reasons, however, we 
argue that a new scale is needed in order 
to examine the psychology of speciesism 
specifically with sufficient precision. 
Dhont et al. (2014; 2016) and Piazza et al. 
(2015) have also recognized the need for a 
new way to measure speciesism, and to 
this end developed ad hoc measurement 
instruments to help elucidate how 
humans think about animals. However, 
while these instruments have been used to 
good effect to advance our understanding 
of human-animal relationships, they 
suffer from theoretical limitations and 
were produced without statistical 
validation and established scale 
development procedures. A 
comprehensive validated measuring tool 
for speciesism therefore remains 
unavailable in the existing literature, for 
multiple reasons.  
First, existing scales do not explicitly 
capture speciesism, as it is properly 
defined: Attributing moral status to an 
individual solely on the basis of their 
species. Instead, existing scales capture 
related, yet distinct, concepts such as 
general attitudes towards animals or 
views on animal rights.  
Second, some items in existing scales 
confound empirical and normative issues. 
Consider the following item by Wuensch 
et al. (2002): “Most cosmetics research 
done on animals is unnecessary and 
invalid”. This item is limited as it 
confounds the normative belief that 
animals should not be subjected to 
suffering with the empirical belief in the 
efficacy of scientific testing. There is no 
way to accurately respond to the item if, 
for example, you believe the research is 
scientifically valid but morally abhorrent, 
or if you believe the research is morally 
acceptable but scientifically useless. Or 
consider another item on the scale, which 
reads: “There are plenty of viable 
alternatives to the use of animals in 
biomedical and behavioral research” 
(Wuensch et al., 2002). Again, this item is 
flawed as it relates to an empirical fact, 
not a belief about the moral standing of 
animals. A coherent anti-speciesist could 
believe that there are few viable 
alternatives to the use of animals in 
research while maintaining testing on 
animals is morally wrong.  
Third, a common difficulty in 
capturing speciesism is that people who 
endorse anti-speciesism can come to 
different conclusions about certain 
practices depending on the philosophical 
position they hold, such as 
consequentialism and deontology. 
Consequentialism, including 
utilitarianism, is the moral view that the 
rightness of an action depends only on its 
consequences (Bentham, 1789/1961; Mill, 
1861). Deontology is the moral view that 
certain actions are forbidden irrespective 
THE MORAL STANDING OF ANIMALS   Page 8 
   
Caviola, Everett, & Faber (2018)  Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 
of the consequences (Kant, 1785/1964). A 
consequentialist anti-speciesist might, for 
example, agree to harm animals (or 
humans) if this were to result in better 
overall outcome for all sentient beings 
(Kahane et al., 2015). A deontological anti-
speciesist, however, would refuse to harm 
animals (or humans) even if the outcome 
would be better for everyone. Given this 
divergence, unless carefully devised, 
items that, for example, assess people’s 
attitudes on using animals for medical 
testing can be unhelpful (e.g. some items 
by Herzog et al., 1991). This is because 
they might distinguish between a 
consequentialist anti-speciesist (who may 
endorse research using animals if it results 
in the development of a drug that saves 
many lives in the long run), and a 
deontological anti-speciesist (who may 
reject research using animals because it 
violates a general rule of not harming 
others). Such a distinction, however, is a 
factor that should not be captured by a 
speciesism scale as, ultimately, the scale 
must be able to identify speciesism 
without being confounded by unrelated 
specifics of the underlying moral position 
a person may hold. 
Requirements for a Speciesism Scale 
In order to ensure that our scale 
captures the precise philosophical 
meaning of speciesism, we outlined the 
following requirements to be met:  
First, the initial set of items (subjected 
to exploratory factor analysis) should 
capture speciesism both exclusively and 
exhaustively. We assume that speciesism 
will manifest itself both in general beliefs 
about the moral inferiority of certain 
species and in the endorsement of 
concrete practices involving the use of 
animals. All major manifestations of 
speciesism must be covered and core 
manifestations of speciesism must receive 
appropriate representation, such as the 
use of animals for entertainment, food, 
and medical experiments.  
To capture all relevant manifestations 
of speciesism the item pool should consist 
of both abstract-general and concrete-
empirical items. There are benefits and 
drawbacks to including concrete items. 
On the one hand, benefits of concrete 
items include the fact that people’s 
attitudes are likely to be inconsistent and 
limited by self-serving biases, and 
concrete items can expose this 
inconsistency. For example, people might 
agree with an abstract item such as 
“species membership is not a morally 
relevant criterion”, but disagree with a 
concrete item such as “animals should not 
be hunted for sport”. Another advantage 
of concrete items is that they may be 
easier for laypeople to understand and 
respond to. As this scale is primarily for 
use by laypeople and not philosophers, 
ease of comprehension is an important 
factor. On the other hand, disadvantages 
of concrete items include the fact that they 
inevitably create empirical confounders. 
Take a person’s views on animals 
performing in the circus, for example. To 
some extent, the issue poses the empirical 
question of how far circus animals suffer. 
People might have different experiences 
of circuses, which might cause them to 
have different views on the level of 
suffering circuses cause for animals. These 
beliefs about circus conditions might be 
entirely independent of their moral 
values. Given these arguments about 
concrete items, we aimed to strike an 
appropriate balance between 
philosophically rigorous items and 
concrete items in the final scale.    
 Second, items should avoid 
normative confounders. In particular, it is 
important that items do not prompt 
different responses from deontological 
and consequentialist anti-speciesists. As 
we have explored above, there is the 
potential for consequentialist and 
deontological anti-speciesists to be 
divided on a number of issues related to 
the treatment or rights of animals. 
Therefore, when we referred to an 
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empirical situation in our items, we 
ensured the situation was such that most 
consequentialist and deontological (anti-) 
speciesists would reach the same 
conclusion. 
Study 1. Scale Development 
In Study 1 we began our process of 
developing the Speciesism Scale (Aim I) 
by formulating and testing a pool of 
theoretically-validated items to measure 
speciesism. 
Method 
Item Selection 
To formulate a list of items, we used a 
combination of partially modified 
versions of items from existing scales 
(Herzog et al. 1991; Wuensch et al. 2002) 
and entirely new items. We then sent 
these proposed items to renowned experts 
from a number of disciplines, including 
the philosophers Peter Singer and Oscar 
Horta, and the legal scholar Steven Wise1. 
After incorporating feedback from these 
experts and excluding items that did not 
meet our criteria, we were left with a 27-
item pool (see Table 1). In line with our 
prerequisites for the scale, these items 
included both concrete (e.g. “It is morally 
acceptable for cattle and pigs to be raised 
for human consumption”) and abstract 
items (e.g. “Some beings are morally more 
important than others just because they 
belong to a certain species.”); and items 
tapping both the belief in the superiority 
of humans over animals (“Morally, 
animals always count for less than 
humans”) and the superiority of certain 
animals over other animals (“Pigs should 
be taken care of by humans just like dogs 
are”: reverse-scored).  
Ethics Statement 
                                                      
 
 
1 Of course, while we sought feedback 
from these experts, we are fully responsible 
for these items should any criticism occur. 
For all studies in this paper, our 
institution’s ethical guidelines were 
followed and the research was approved 
through University of Oxford’s Central 
University Research Ethics Committee, 
with the reference number MSD-IDREC-
C1-2014-133.  
Participants and Procedure 
1,122 US American participants took 
part in the study online via Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk), and received a 
payment of $0.50 for their participation.. 
Five participants were excluded for not 
completing the study, and nine because 
they failed a simple attention check 
embedded in the survey where people 
were asked to select a certain scale point 
to confirm they were paying attention. 
This left a final sample of 1,108 
participants (457 female; Mage = 33, SD = 
11.56), representing an excellent sample 
size. In contrast to experimental studies 
there are no straightforward and 
commonly accepted techniques to 
determine sample size for factor analyses 
(Mundfrom, Shaw, & Ke, 2005). One 
approach is to rely on the absolute sample 
size. Estimations by Comrey and Lee 
(1992) suggest that a sample size of 300 is 
adequate, and that 1,000 or more is 
excellent. In general, the literature agrees 
that in exploratory factor analyses the 
higher the sample size the better (e.g. 
Costello & Osborne, 2005). A different 
approach is to aim for a subject-to-item 
ratio of at least 5:1 (Gorsuch, 1983), better 
10:1 or higher (Everitt, 1975; Nunnally, 
1978). Our final sample of 1,108 therefore 
represents a size that is more than 
adequate, and with 27 items, gave us an 
excellent final subject-to-item ratio of 41:1.  
Items were presented in randomized 
order and participants were asked to 
indicate to which extent they agreed with 
the statements on a Likert scale from 1 
(strongly disagree), over 4 (neither agree nor 
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). If not further 
specified this response scale was used for 
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all established measures throughout our 
five studies. 
We chose to conduct the study online 
for a number of reasons. Research 
suggests that data obtained via online 
platforms such as Amazon 
MechanicalTurk is of high quality 
(Paolacci & Chandler, 2014) and that 
results are comparable to results from 
campus studies (Bartneck, Duenser, 
Moltchanova, & Zawieska, 2015). 
Importantly for our purposes, it was 
critical to have a broad sample that is 
representative of the general public in 
terms of education background, gender, 
and age, as speciesism is likely to correlate 
with such factors. Online participants 
have been shown to be more diverse 
(Shapiro, Chandler, & Mueller, 2013) and 
highly representative (Buhrmeister, 
Kwang, & Gosling, 2011), more so than 
traditional samples (e.g. Berinsky, Huber, 
& Lenz, 2012; Rand, 2012)—largely 
because online studies allow for the 
recruitment of broader population 
samples than the often-limited university 
student samples.  
Results 
Exploratory Factor Analysis 
 We first conducted Exploratory Factor 
Analysis (EFA) using the principal axis 
factors extraction method to determine the 
factor structure of the 27 items. Oblique 
direct oblimin rotation was chosen as we 
expected that underlying factors would 
correlate. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) 
measure of sampling adequacy was .94, 
which is above the recommended value of 
.6, indicating that individual items shared 
enough common variance for such an 
analysis. Bartlett’s test of sphericity was 
significant: χ2(351) = 12,748.82, p < .001. 
The first factor explained 34.04% of the 
variance (eigenvalue = 9.20), the second 
factor 9.39% of the variance (eigenvalue = 
2.54), the third factor 5.30% of the variance 
(eigenvalue = 1.43), the fourth factor 
5.08% of the variance (eigenvalue = 1.37), 
and the fifth factor 3.83% of the variance 
(eigenvalue = 1.04). 
The scree plot displayed a clear 
inflexion point, which justified retaining 
two factors. As such, we ran a further 
analysis, specified to extract two factors. 
The first extracted factor seemed to 
capture our intended construct of 
speciesism including both abstract items 
and more concrete items capturing 
attitudes towards animal exploitation and 
animal rights. The second factor captured 
ethical vegetarianism (e.g. “It is morally 
wrong to eat fish”). 
Based on theoretical and statistical (see 
CFA below) considerations, we decided to 
retain the first factor only. It best captured 
the “pure” theoretical construct of 
speciesism, in isolation from other 
constructs. In this context, it is notable 
that factor analysis extracted speciesism 
and ethical vegetarianism as separate 
constructs. This is evidence that the two 
constructs are psychologically distinct. 
The speciesism factor and the ethical 
vegetarianism factor correlated negatively 
with each other, r = -.35, p < .001. 
Items for the further development of 
the scale were selected or excluded on the 
basis of theoretical and statistical 
considerations. In particular, we focused 
on including items with high factor 
loadings while ensuring that theoretically 
relevant aspects of speciesism were 
captured by the set of items. We 
prioritized items that did not include 
empirical assumptions about the 
intelligence or suffering of animals to 
avoid confounding assumptions (e.g. 
items three or eight). Our set of selected 
items contained ten items (Table 1). 
 
[Table 1] 
 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
In order to examine the model fit of 
the ten extracted items we performed a 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) 
relying on maximum likelihood 
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estimation in R using the lavaan package 
(version 0.5). 
We used a combination of fit indices to 
judge the model fit. Our primary model fit 
index was the Comparative Fit Index 
(CFI) score, which indicates how well the 
data fits the target model compared to an 
independent model that assumes 
uncorrelated variables. CFI is frequently 
reported and, in comparison to other fit 
indices, not unduly influenced by sample 
size (Fan, Thompson, & Wang, 1999). 
Based on recommendations in the 
literature we considered a model to have 
an acceptable fit if its CFI score was .93 or 
higher (Byrne, 1994). Due to the 
robustness of the CFI we decided to reject 
any model that would not meet the 
required CFI standard. 
For models with an acceptable fit 
according to CFI we furthermore 
considered the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI), 
which is an incremental fit index and 
must lie above .90, and ideally above .95 
(Hu & Bentler, 1999; Marsh, Balla, & 
McDonald, 1988). We also applied the 
more traditional Chi-square test. 
However, it must be noted that the Chi-
square test for CFA is considered to be an 
unreliable fit index since it is very 
sensitive to sample size and will usually 
result in significant outcomes for sample 
sizes larger than 200 (Steiger, 2007). 
Finally, we considered the Standardized 
Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR), 
which represents the standardized 
discrepancy between the predicted and 
observed correlation and must lie below 
.08 to justify adequate model fit (Hu & 
Bentler, 1999).  
A first CFA revealed an unsatisfactory 
model fit with a CFI of 0.88, which lies 
below the required standard (TLI = .85; 
SRMR = .06). Results showed that 
unexplained variances correlated highly 
among each other. This implied that 
certain items shared variance among each 
other that was not captured by general 
speciesism. For example, items two and 
four both captured the use of animals for 
entertainment and as such tapped into a 
distinct sub-form of speciesism. Similar 
redundancies were found between items 
five and seven that were both highly 
abstract without tapping into real-world 
examples, items six and nine both tapped 
into the domain of research use with 
animals, and items twelve and seventeen 
both captured attitudes towards animal 
rights. Given these redundancies, we 
chose to exclude items four, six, seven, 
and twelve from the final scale, as they 
did not serve any additional explanatory 
purpose.  
A second CFA with the remaining six 
items was then conducted. The CFI was 
.98, which suggests adequate model fit. 
TLI was .96, which indicates excellent fit. 
SRMR was .07, which is in the range of 
acceptable values. In contrast, to the 
already mentioned fit indices, the Chi-
square test yielded a poor fit, χ2(9) = 52.87, 
p < .001. However, as mentioned the Chi-
square test is considered to be an 
unreliable fit index for which reason we 
did not strongly weight its result but still 
report it for completeness sake. As such, 
CFA indicated that the model of the six-
item scale was an appropriate fit. 
Furthermore, a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
for normality suggested that the scores 
were normally distributed, D(1108) = .02, 
p = .20. 
Finally, we conducted a third CFA in 
which we tested the model fit of a two-
factor model, which includes both the 
speciesism and ethical vegetarianism 
factor. The model included the six 
speciesism items and five ethical 
vegetarianism items that loaded onto the 
second extracted factor (Table 1). The 
model fit, however, was unsatisfactory 
(CFI = .88; TLI = .85; SRMR = .08). Only 
after removing items 26 and 27 the model 
fit became satisfactory (CFI = .96; TLI = 
.94; SRMR = .05). However, due to its low 
item count and its non-normally 
distributed scores (Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
test for normality: D(1108) = .11, p < .001) 
we do not recommend using the ethical 
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vegetarianism factor as a measurement 
instrument.  
Confirmatory Factor Analysis on a 
Separate Dataset 
In order to confirm our six-item one-
factor solution we collected a new set of 
data with which to test our model. 200 US 
American participants took part in the 
study online via MTurk and received 
$0.70 for taking part. Four participants did 
not complete and nine were excluded for 
failing the attention check question. This 
left a final sample of 187 US American 
participants (89 female; Mage = 35.73, SD = 
10.36). This sample size is again adequate 
according to the rule of thumb of aiming 
for a subject-to-item ratio of at least 1:10 
(Everitt, 1975; Nunnally, 1978) as in our 
case the ratio was 31:1. Furthermore, our 
sample size nearly equals Jackson’s (2001) 
recommendation to recruit a minimum of 
200 participants for CFA relying on 
maximum likelihood estimation. 
Participants responded to the speciesism 
items and demographic questions. This 
new data set provided very strong 
evidence for the six-item model, where the 
CFI was .99, TLI was .99, the SRMR was 
.02, and even the Chi-square test yielded 
an acceptable fit, χ2(9) = 11.87, p = .22.  
The Speciesism Scale 
Based on a series of EFA and CFAs, 
we arrived at our final items to form a 
Speciesism Scale (Table 2). The Speciesism 
Scale consists of six items all loading onto 
a single factor. Speciesism scores were 
normally distributed across the sample 
with a mean of 3.64 (SD = 1.25) where the 
minimum was 1 and the maximum 7. 
Reliability analyses yielded that the six-
items scale had high internal consistency, 
with a Cronbach’s alpha of .81. 
 
[Table 2] 
 
Discussion 
The goal of Study 1 was the 
development of a theoretically informed 
and empirically sound Speciesism Scale. A 
combination of EFA, CFA, and reliability 
analysis supported the development of a 
one-dimensional scale. All six items 
strongly loaded onto a single speciesism 
factor, which had good model fit and high 
internal consistency, and this model was 
confirmed by an additional CFA 
conducted on a separate dataset. Most 
importantly, the scale fulfills all 
requirements that were stipulated at the 
beginning of the study: all items explicitly 
capture speciesism and the scale 
encompasses crucial aspects of the 
theoretical concept; experts in relevant 
fields validated all items; the scale consists 
of both abstract and empirical items; and 
does not contain items eliciting empirical 
and normative confounding factors.  
It is interesting that speciesism and 
ethical vegetarianism were — despite 
being strongly correlated — 
psychologically distinct factors. At first 
blush, this result might be surprising, as 
one might expect that endorsement of 
anti-speciesism would consistently result 
in endorsement of ethical vegetarianism. 
However, this finding is consistent with 
previous research on the meat paradox 
(Bratanova, et al, 2011; Bastian & 
Loughnan, 2016). People might endorse 
anti-speciesism in the abstract or in 
domains where it does not conflict with 
their personal preferences, but they 
employ specific beliefs and practices in 
the context of food (i.e. carnism; Monteiro 
et al., 2017; Piazza et al., 2015).  
  
Study 2. Temporal Stability 
We have hypothesized that speciesism 
is a psychological form of prejudice 
analogous to other psychological forms of 
prejudice such as racism or sexism. If this 
is the case speciesism should — like other 
forms of prejudice — be a relatively stable 
construct that persists over time. Of 
course, like any other form of prejudice, 
the extent to which a person holds 
speciesist attitudes can fluctuate 
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depending on the situation and other 
conditional factors. Ultimately, however, 
the extent to which a person holds 
speciesist attitudes should stay relatively 
stable over time because otherwise 
speciesism could not be considered a 
psychological prejudice analogous to 
racism or sexism, but a short-term belief 
connected to spontaneous emotional 
reactions. In order to investigate the 
temporal stability of speciesist attitudes, 
we examined the test-retest reliability of 
the Speciesism Scale over a period of four 
weeks. To the extent that speciesism does 
represent a stable prejudice, scores at the 
two times should be highly correlated. 
Methods 
The study consisted of two stages: a 
first stage in which participants completed 
the speciesism scale, and then a second 
stage four weeks later in which these same 
participants were invited to again 
complete the scale. In the first stage, 685 
participants took part via MTurk and 
received a payment of $0.50 for their 
participation. Eight participants were 
excluded for failing the attention check 
question, leaving a final sample of 677 US 
American participants (305 female; Mage = 
34.37, SD = 10.94). We conservatively 
assumed a response rate of around 30% 
for the second stage of the study and an 
expected effect size (Pearson correlation 
coefficient) between 0.6 and 0.8. Based on 
sample size calculations for test-retest 
analyses in the literature (Shoukri et al., 
2004) we decided to aim for at least 200 
responding participants in the second 
stage and as such aimed to recruit 680 in 
the first stage (given the expected 30% 
response rate). Participants completed the 
Speciesism Scale but were not informed 
about the follow-up study. Other filler 
measures were included to distract from 
the speciesism items.  
In the second stage four weeks later, 
all 677 participants were contacted again 
with information about the retest study. 
333 US American participants (164 female; 
Mage = 36.82, SD = 11.51) completed the 
retest study (giving a higher-than-
expected response rate of 49%), and all 
participants again received $0.50 payment 
for taking part. No participants were 
excluded at this stage, and this final 
sample of 333 is more than adequate, 
exceeding minimum recommendations for 
test-retest analyses (Shoukri et al., 2004). 
Results and Discussion 
Internal consistency was high for both 
stages of the study with a Cronbach alpha 
of .89 for the first stage and .90 for the 
second stage of the study, and—
critically—a retest analysis with the 333 
cases revealed a test-retest correlation 
coefficient of r = .88, p < .001. That is, 
participants’ scores on the Speciesism 
Scale were very highly correlated with 
their scores on the same scale four weeks 
later. The high test-retest reliability is an 
important part of establishing speciesism 
as a temporally stable psychological 
prejudice and demonstrates that 
speciesism—similar to racism or sexism—
is not just a short-term belief or emotional 
reaction, but a stable view that persists 
over time.  
Although our primary purpose for this 
study was to consider test-retest 
reliability, given that for the first sample 
we had a sample size of 677, we decided 
to subject the resulting speciesism ratings 
to an additional CFA to investigate if our 
six-item one-factor structure revealed in 
the two independent samples of Study 1 
holds a third confirmatory test. Results 
confirmed once again that our six-item 
model had excellent fit (CFI = 0.98, TLI = 
0.97, SRMR = 0.02). 
Overall, in Study 2 we provided 
further psychometric support for our 
Speciesism Scale, finding excellent fit for 
our model in an independent data sample 
and finding good test-retest reliability 
over time. Of course, the results from 
Study 2 cannot show that speciesism is a 
result of similar psychological processes 
to other forms of prejudice, only that 
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speciesism can in fact be considered a 
stable and measurable attitude like racism 
and sexism. In Study 3 we turned to look 
at how similar speciesism is to other forms 
of prejudice in terms of content. 
 
Study 3. Convergent Validity 
In Study 1 we developed a new and 
reliable scale to measure speciesism, and 
in Study 2, we confirmed that speciesism 
scores were persistent over time. 
Combined, the results of Studies 1 and 2 
highlight that speciesism is a stable 
psychological construct. Having met our 
first aim—to develop a reliable and valid 
scale to measure speciesism—we next 
turned to our second aim: to better 
understand the nature of speciesism by 
looking at what other attitudes speciesism 
is associated with, and which more 
general psychological orientations drive 
such speciesist attitudes. By doing so we 
sought to establish convergent validity of 
the Speciesism Scale. 
In Study 3, equipped with our new 
scale, we explored whether speciesism 
might usefully be described as a form of 
prejudice by shedding light on the 
relationship of speciesism with other 
psychological constructs. We took a two-
pronged approach: first, we tested 
whether speciesism correlates with other 
forms of prejudice (Aim IIa); and second, 
we looked at whether speciesism, like 
other forms of prejudice, is driven by 
socio-ideological factors such as social 
dominance orientation or right-wing 
authoritarianism that maintain other 
forms of intergroup conflict (Aim IIb).  
Our first aim—Aim IIa—was drawn 
from the personality approach to 
prejudice, which suggests that prejudice is 
typically a generalized phenomenon: a 
person who is high on ethnic prejudice 
will also be high on gender-based 
prejudice, and so on (Allport, 1954). For 
example, prejudice toward various targets 
tend to be significantly correlated 
(Akrami, Ekehammer, & Bergh, 2011), and 
factor analyses yield a generalized 
prejudice factor explaining 50% to 60% of 
the variance in different forms of 
prejudice (Ekehammar & Akrami, 2003). If 
speciesism is indeed to be usefully 
considered a form of prejudice, people 
who hold stronger speciesist attitudes 
should also exhibit other prejudicial 
attitudes.  
Our second aim—Aim IIb—is a result 
of the reasoning, as suggested by the SD-
HARM model (Dhont et al., 2016), that if 
speciesism is a form of prejudice it should 
share psychological roots with other 
forms of prejudice. In this way, we hoped 
both to further validate the Speciesism 
Scale by showing it to be correlated with 
social dominance orientation and related 
socio-ideological constructs, as well as 
providing independent support for the 
claims of the SD-HARM model.  
As a third and more exploratory 
aim—Aim IIc—, we aimed to investigate 
the relationship between speciesism with 
empathic concern and actively open-
minded thinking. A previous study has 
already identified a relation between 
empathy levels and attitudes to animals 
(Taylor & Signal, 2005) and as such we 
hypothesized that people higher in 
empathic concern would care more about 
the suffering of animals and subsequently 
endorse less speciesist attitudes. Similarly, 
because speciesist attitudes predominate 
in society, we predicted that actively 
open-minded people, people who are 
more willing to change their beliefs 
(Baron, 2000) and think beyond the 
currently accepted norms, are more likely 
to endorse anti-speciesism.  
Method and Results 
257 US American participants took 
part in the study online via MTurk, and 
received $1 payment for their 
participation. Fifteen participants were 
excluded for failing an attention check, 
leaving a final sample of 242 people (110 
female; Mage = 36.33, SD = 11.88). With that, 
our sample size met the recommendations 
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of Comrey and Lee (1992) to recruit at 
least 200-300 participants for scale 
validation. Furthermore, a review of over 
a hundred scale validation studies 
revealed that the median sample size of 
such studies was 121, and so with a final 
sample of 242 we were confident that our 
sample size was more than adequate 
(Anthoine, Moret, Regnault, Sébille, & 
Hardouin, 2014).  
In the main part of the study, 
participants were asked to complete to the 
Speciesism Scale and a number of separate 
scales presented in a random order, which 
are discussed in turn along with their 
results below. At the end of the study 
participants responded to demographic 
questions including age, gender, 
education (six-step continuous scale from 
“less than high school degree” to 
“graduate degree”), income (10-step 
continuous scale from “under $5,000 per 
year” to “over $100,000 per year”), and 
whether they are vegetarian (yes or no). 
Median education level was “attended 
college” (M = 4.22, SD = 1.29) and median 
annual income level was “$25,001-
$35,000” (M = 5.22, SD = 2.34).  
We note that two items from the 
original item pool that in Study 1 were 
shown not to load on the main speciesism 
factor were included in this (and all 
following) studies. To ensure that our 
results for the main Speciesism Scale hold 
over and beyond the inclusion of these 
two items, we explored whether results 
changed when these two items were 
added to the scale. As it did not, this issue 
is further ignored. Due to the multiple 
correlation analyses we conducted with 
speciesism we relied on a Bonferroni 
adjusted alpha level of .006 per test (.05/9) 
as an indicator for statistical significance 
(see Table 3 for all correlation coefficients).  
Prejudicial Attitudes 
Our first set of measures was intended 
to address Aim 2a: to what extent does 
speciesism correlate with other, 
prototypical forms of prejudice? To the 
extent that speciesism is—as philosophers 
have argued it to be—a form of prejudice, 
it should be correlated with other forms of 
prejudice. Specifically, we looked at three 
prototypical forms of prejudice: prejudice 
based on ethnic background or race 
(racism), prejudice based on gender 
(sexism), and prejudice based on sexual 
orientation (homophobia). A growing 
body of research has suggested that 
speciesism is associated with prejudice, 
but most of this has used simple feeling 
thermometer type questions (Dhont et al., 
2014; 2016). In our study, therefore we 
drew upon this work but relied on widely 
used and empirically validated scales.     
First, to tap racism, we used the 
Modern Racism Scale (McConahay, 1986). 
This consists of 7 items and includes items 
such as “Blacks are getting too demanding 
in their push for equal rights” (internal 
consistency: α = .75). Second, to look at 
sexism we used the Modern Sexism Scale 
(Swim, Aikin, Hall, & Hunter, 1995). This 
consists of 8 items and included items 
such as “Women often miss out on good 
jobs due to sexual discrimination” (α = 
.92). Third, to look at homophobia, we 
used the revised short version of the 
Attitudes Toward Lesbians And Gay Men 
Scale (Herek, 1998). This consists of 10 
items including “The idea of homosexual 
marriages seems ridiculous to me” (α = 
.97). To the extent that speciesism is a 
form of prejudice analogous to other 
kinds, speciesist attitudes should be 
associated with increased ethnic, gender, 
and sexuality-based prejudice, just like 
these types of prejudice are typically 
associated with one another (Pratto et al., 
1994). Indeed, confirming the contention 
that speciesism is correlated with other 
forms of prejudice, we found significant 
positive correlations of speciesism with 
racism (r = .32, p < .001), sexism (r = .41, p 
< .001), and homophobia (r = .17, p < .001).  
Socio-Ideological Beliefs 
Our second set of measures were 
intended to address Aim 2b: to explore 
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whether speciesism, like other forms of 
prejudice, is driven by socio-ideological 
factors. Four such socio-ideological factors 
stand out in previous research on 
prejudice and intergroup conflict: Social 
Dominance Orientation (SDO; Pratto et 
al., 1994); political conservatism (e.g. Jost 
et al., 2003); system-justification (Kay, & 
Jost, 2003); and right-wing 
authoritarianism (RWA; Altemeyer, 1988).  
We first looked at Social Dominance 
Orientation (SDO; Pratto et al., 1994). As 
discussed above, the SD-HARM (Dhont et 
al., 2016) model posits that SDO 
underpins both speciesism and human-
human types of prejudice, and so we 
predicted that SDO would be correlated 
with speciesism and that SDO would 
account for the correlation between 
speciesism and human-human types of 
prejudice. SDO was measured using the 
SDO-6 scale (Pratto et al., 1994), which 
consists of 8 items including “Some 
groups of people are simply inferior to 
other groups” (α = .93). Second, we looked 
at political conservatism, which has been 
previously found to correlate with 
speciesism (Dhont et al., 2016). We 
measured conservatism using a standard 
measure (e.g. Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 
2009; Stern, West, Jost, & Rule, 2013; 
Poteat & Mereish, 2012) where 
participants indicated on two Likert scales 
from 1 (very liberal) to 7 (very 
conservative) the degree to which they 
identify as economically and socially 
conservatives respectively. The two 
measures were aggregated in the analysis. 
Third, we looked at system-
justification (Kay, & Jost, 2003), which to 
our knowledge has not been investigated 
in the context of speciesism before. The 
scale consists of 8 items including “In 
general, you find society to be fair” (α = 
.86). People who score high in system-
justification tend to justify and defend the 
status quo, and given that the status quo 
places strict hierarchies amongst animals, 
we therefore assumed that they would 
also be more likely to defend the current 
speciesist norm. And fourth and finally, 
we looked at right-wing authoritarianism 
(RWA; Altemeyer, 1988), a construct 
tapping into the extent to which people 
adhere to established authorities and 
conventions and their hostility towards 
those who do not. The scale consists of 15 
items including “The established 
authorities generally turn out to be right 
about things, while the radicals and 
protestors are usually just ‘loud mouths’ 
showing off their ignorance” (α = .92). 
Results showed that, supporting 
predictions, speciesism was significantly 
correlated with SDO (r = .42, p < .001), 
political conservatism (r = .25, p < .001), 
system-justification (r = .25, p < .001). The 
correlation between speciesism and RWA 
was positive, but not considered 
statistically significant under the adjusted 
Bonferroni alpha level of .006 (r = .14, p = 
.03). People that were more speciesist 
were also more likely to endorse 
hierarchies between groups, report a more 
conservative political ideology, and more 
likely to engage in system justification. 
Recall that the SD-HARM model suggests 
that SDO is the common ideological root 
of both speciesism and human-human 
types of prejudice. In order to test this 
hypothesis we conducted partial 
correlation analyses between speciesism 
and the other measures in which we 
controlled for SDO. And indeed, when 
controlling for SDO we found that all 
partial correlations but sexism and 
empathic concern became non-significant 
(Table 2). 
Empathic concern and Actively Open-
Minded Thinking 
Finally, we addressed Aim 2c: 
identifying the relation between 
speciesism and empathic concern as well 
as actively open-minded thinking. We 
used the Empathic Concern scale, which 
forms part of the Interpersonal Reactivity 
Index (IRI; Davis, 1983) and consists of 7 
items such as “When I see someone being 
taken advantage of, I feel kind of 
THE MORAL STANDING OF ANIMALS   Page 17 
   
Caviola, Everett, & Faber (2018)  Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 
protective toward them” (α = .97). As 
predicted the results revealed that 
speciesism correlated negatively with 
empathic concern (r = -.46, p < .001). 
Next, we looked at actively open-
minded thinking (Baron, 2000). The scale 
we relied on (Stanovich & West, 1997) 
consists of the subscales dogmatic 
thinking, categorical thinking, flexible 
thinking, counterfactual thinking, and 
openness. In total it consists of 40 items 
such as “A person should always consider 
new possibilities" (α = .92).  Speciesism 
correlated negatively with actively open-
minded thinking (r = -.17, p = .01). This 
was mainly driven by dogmatic thinking 
(r = .21, p < .001) and flexible thinking (r = 
-.16, p = .01) and less so by openness (r = 
.10, p = .07), categorical thinking (r = .10, p 
= .13) or counterfactual thinking (r = .03, p 
= .63).  
Vegetarianism 
Fourteen of the 242 participants (6%) 
stated that they were vegetarian, and they 
were more likely to disagree with 
speciesism than the rest of the sample, 
t(240) = 5.64, p < .001, d = 1.77. Like in 
Study 1, speciesism correlated negatively 
with items capturing attitudes towards 
vegetarianism (second extracted factor of 
Study 1, see Table 1), r(240) = -.31, p < 
.001. 
Demographics 
There was a significant effect of 
gender such that men (M = 3.82, SD = 
1.30) were more likely to show speciesist 
attitudes than women (M = 2.91, SD = 
1.26), t(239) = 5.46, p < .001, d = 0.71. The 
negative correlation between speciesism 
and age did not reach significance, r(240) 
= -.11, p = .08, and there were no 
significant correlations between 
speciesism and level of education r(247) = 
-.02, p = .75, or income r(247) = .10, p = .11. 
 
[Table 3] 
 
Discussion 
As hypothesized, speciesism was 
positively associated with prejudicial 
attitudes such as racism, sexism, and 
homophobia. Speciesism was also 
positively associated with socio-
ideological beliefs such as social 
dominance orientation, conservatism, 
system justification, and right-wing 
authoritarianism. Furthermore, speciesism 
was negatively associated with actively 
open-minded thinking and empathic 
concern. Note, however, that the 
correlations between speciesism and 
right-wing authoritarianism and actively 
open-minded thinking were relatively 
weak and not statistically significant 
under the adjusted Bonferroni alpha level 
of .006. 
Our findings lead us to conclude that 
speciesism can be considered a 
psychological prejudice analogous to 
other forms of prejudice. First, our results 
are consistent with Allport’s assumption 
(1954) of an underlying generalized 
prejudice: a person who exhibits one type 
of prejudice will likely also exhibit other 
types of prejudice, and importantly this 
extends to prejudice based on species 
membership. This suggests that there is a 
common component of generalized 
prejudice that drives different types of 
specific prejudicial attitudes such as 
racism, sexism, homophobia as well as 
speciesism (Akrami et al., 2011). Second, 
our results support the SD-HARM theory 
(Dhont et al., 2016), which assumes that 
the same ideological roots that underpin 
human-human forms of prejudice also 
underpin speciesism. More specifically, 
the fact that SDO accounted for the 
relation between speciesism and other 
types of prejudice supports the notion that 
a general endorsement of social hierarchy 
and inequality drives these different 
manifestations of prejudice. The 
generalized prejudice and SD-HARM 
hypotheses are not mutually exclusive: 
research has shown, for example, that the 
THE MORAL STANDING OF ANIMALS   Page 18 
   
Caviola, Everett, & Faber (2018)  Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 
generalized prejudice factor is strongly 
related to SDO, RWA as well as empathy 
(Bäckström & Björklund, 2007; McFarland, 
2010) — findings that are consistent with 
our results.  
Further, our results suggest that 
people who endorse views on the political 
right are more likely to display speciesist 
attitudes. Considering that speciesism is 
the accepted social norm in Western 
society, it is not surprising that those who 
endorse the status quo are more likely to 
endorse speciesism. These findings are in 
line with previous research showing that 
people who consume meat score higher 
on SDO and RWA scales than vegetarians 
(Allen & Baines, 2002; Allen, Wilson, Ng, 
& Dunne, 2000).  
The observation that speciesism 
correlated negatively with actively open-
minded thinking supports our 
assumption that those who accept anti-
speciesism are more willing to think 
beyond contemporary social norms. And 
as expected, speciesism correlated 
negatively with empathic concern. This 
correlation remained strong even when 
controlling for SDO, which suggests that 
empathic concern is an additional and 
independent route to reach anti-speciesist 
attitudes. This is in line with previous 
research showing that in addition to SDO 
and RWA low empathy is one of the roots 
of generalized prejudice (McFarland, 
2010). 
As in the first study, we found that 
male participants were more likely to 
endorse speciesist views than female 
participants. This confirms a similar 
finding that women have kinder attitudes 
towards animals than men (for a review 
see Mathews & Herzog, 1997; Herzog, et 
al., 1991). Notably, previous research has 
pointed out that meat consumption is 
often related to masculinity. Rothgerber 
(2013) has found that for some men meat 
consumption makes them feel like “real 
men”. People who consume meat are 
perceived as more masculine (Ruby & 
Heine, 2011) and meat has become a 
metaphor for masculinity (Rozin, Hormes, 
Faith, & Wansink, 2012). 
 
Study 4. Helping via Donation 
Allocations 
Thus far we have argued that 
speciesism is a psychological construct 
and developed a valid and reliable 
measure of speciesism (Study 1); 
confirmed that speciesist attitudes are 
consistent over time (Study 2); and shown 
that speciesism can usefully be considered 
a form of prejudice, being associated with 
other forms of prejudice and sharing 
common ideological roots with them 
(Study 3). Next, we turned to the more 
behavioral effects that speciesist attitudes 
might have by looking at whether 
speciesism can predict decision-making in 
the context of charitable giving. Previous 
work has exclusively focused on self-
report items relating to feelings or beliefs 
about the relationship between humans 
and animals. In Studies 4 and 5 we 
addressed our third aim: to determine 
whether speciesist attitudes translate into 
observable decision-making and behavior. 
Our initial assumption was that 
participants who scored high for 
speciesism would be willing to allocate 
more money to a charity that helps 
individuals of a “superior” species (rather 
than an “inferior” one). In particular, we 
hypothesized that speciesism would drive 
participants to a) help humans more than 
animals, b) help severely mentally 
disabled humans more than chimpanzees, 
and c) help dogs more than pigs. These 
examples capture three crucial aspects of 
speciesism (as defined in philosophy) in 
our society: a) the view that animals are 
morally inferior to humans; b) the view 
that (a) is true even when the humans and 
animals in question have similar cognitive 
abilities; and c) the view that some 
animals are morally inferior to other 
animals (even when these animals have 
similar cognitive and emotional 
capabilities). As such, this study also 
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serves as a philosophically grounded 
validation of our Speciesism Scale. The 
final items of the scale do not directly 
capture aspects (b) and (c). Yet, if it is true 
that there is a single psychological 
construct that captures speciesism in its 
entirety (as defined in philosophy), we 
should expect the scale to predict aspects 
(b) and (c) in addition to aspect (a). 
With these parameters in mind, we 
hypothesized that speciesism would be 
able to predict donation allocations above 
and beyond established discrimination 
and pro-sociality measures such as SDO 
and empathic concern. One of the 
conclusions reached in our third study 
was that speciesism can be considered a 
sub-type of SDO as proposed by SD-
HARM (Dhont et al., 2016). In this study 
we aim to show that speciesism despite its 
strong relation to SDO is able to explain 
discriminatory behavior above and 
beyond it. We would expect speciesist 
behavior to particularly be observed in 
contexts in which individuals of different 
species are contrasted. In such contexts, 
we would expect speciesism to give more 
specific predictions than the more 
generalized concept of SDO. 
Finally, we were also interested in the 
link between speciesism and people’s 
explicit beliefs about the intelligence and 
sentience of animals. It is possible, for 
example, that people are not treating 
certain animals differently because of 
speciesism, but simply because they 
believe that they are less intelligent or less 
able to feel pain. We hypothesized that 
explicit beliefs about intelligence and 
sentience were likely to be associated with 
speciesist views, but would not be able to 
fully explain the differential treatment 
between different species. Instead, we 
expect that speciesism itself—moral 
discrimination based on species 
membership alone—would be able to 
explain differences in donation allocations 
above and beyond explicit beliefs about 
intelligence and sentience.  
Method 
Participants 
140 US American participants took 
part in the study online via MTurk (110 
female; Mage = 33.60, SD = 10.54), and 
received $1.70 for their participation. All 
participants successfully passed the two 
attention check questions, so nobody was 
excluded. We deemed a sample size of 140 
participants appropriate, as our a priori 
power analysis showed that 135 
participants were required to detect an 
anticipated medium effect size of f=0.15, 
taking an alpha of .05 and power of .80 
(Soper, 2017; Cohen, Cohen, West, & 
Aiken, 2003).  
Materials and Procedure 
Participants were presented with three 
independent scenarios of donation 
allocation questions in a random order. In 
each scenario, one of the charities focused 
on helping a “superior” type of species 
(humans, mentally severely disabled 
humans, or dogs), while the other focused 
on helping an “inferior” type of species 
(animals, chimpanzees, or pigs). 
The two charities were presented as 
follows in the first donation scenario: 
Charity A: This charity focuses on 
helping animals. On average, $10 will keep 
one individual from pain and suffering for 
one day.  
Charity B: This charity focuses on 
helping humans. On average, $10 will keep 
one individual from pain and suffering for 
one day. 
In the second scenario the words 
“animals” and “humans” were replaced 
by “chimpanzees” (Charity A) and 
“mentally severely disabled humans” 
(Charity B), in the third scenario by “pigs” 
(Charity A) and “dogs” (Charity B) 
respectively. In all three scenarios, 
participants were asked to allocate 100 
donation points, which were independent 
of participants’ payment, between the two 
charities. They were told that their 
decisions would have a real-world effect, 
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as the experimenters would donate $100 
to the charities in proportion the 
responses received from all participants 
(which we did).  
After participants responded to the 
donation allocation questions, they were 
presented with the Speciesism Scale and 
the following additional measures: Social 
Dominance Orientation was included 
because of the strong link found to 
speciesism in the previous study. 
Attitudes Toward Disabled Persons 
(Yuker, Block, & Young, 1970; from now 
on referred to as ableism) was included in 
order to control for discrimination against 
disabled people in the donation case 
involving mentally severely disabled 
humans. Empathic concern (IRI; Davis 
1983) was included because it showed a 
strong negative correlation with 
speciesism in the previous study. 
Perspective taking, Other-oriented moral 
reasoning and Mutual concerns moral 
reasoning scales of the pro-social 
personality battery (Penner, Fritzsche, 
Craiger, & Freifeld, 1995) were included 
because we assumed that these pro-
sociality traits could potentially play a 
role in reducing prejudice. 
Further, participants were presented 
with a list of six different types of 
individuals: humans in general, animals 
in general, chimpanzees, mentally 
severely disabled humans, dogs, and pigs. 
First, participants were asked to indicate 
to which extent each type of individual 
was capable of experiencing physical pain 
and fear (aggregated and from now on 
referred to as ‘suffering capability’). Then, 
participants were asked to indicate how 
intelligent they perceived each type of 
individual to be. By framing this task as a 
biology quiz, participants were told that 
they should be as accurate as possible in 
their assessment of these traits. Finally, 
participants were asked to respond to 
demographic items. 
Results 
People allocated significantly more to 
the “superior” than to the “inferior” 
species charities in all three cases (Figure 
1). As the allocations to the respective 
charities were negatively proportionate to 
each other, one sample t-tests were 
conducted to compare whether allocations 
significantly differed from an equal 
distribution of 50 donation points each. 
Participants allocated more to help 
humans (M = 67.92, SD = 26.36) than 
animals (M = 32.08, SD = 26.36), t(139) = -
8.04, p < .001, more to help mentally 
severely disabled humans (M = 72.46, SD 
= 23.61) than to chimpanzees (M = 27.54, 
SD = 23.61), t(139) = 11.26, p < .001, and 
more to help dogs (M = 68.57, SD = 31.43) 
than pigs (M = 31.43, SD = 19.43), t(139) = 
-11.29, p < .001. 
Speciesism correlated positively with 
SDO (r = .35, p < .001) and negatively with 
empathic concern (r = -.26, p < .001) and 
other-oriented (r = -.23, p < .05) and 
mutual concern moral reasoning (r = -.20, 
p < .05). However, it did not correlate 
significantly with ableism (r = -.04, p = .60) 
and perspective taking (r = -.09, p = .32). 
Speciesism correlated negatively with 
most measures of beliefs about suffering 
capability and intelligence of animals (but 
not humans), and strongest for members 
of “inferior” species (Table 4). Participants 
believed that humans were more 
intelligent (t(139) = 8.25, p < .001) and 
more capable of suffering (t(139) = 26.63, p 
< .001) than animals (Table 4). However, 
despite allocating more money to help 
mentally severally disabled humans than 
chimpanzees, they believed the former 
were less intelligent (t(139) = 4.98, p < 
.001) and — although only on a 
descriptive level  —  less capable of 
suffering (t(139) = 1.71, p = .09) than the 
latter. Also, participants believed that 
dogs were more intelligent (t(139) = 2.22, p 
= .03) and more capable of suffering 
(t(139) = 5.58, p < .001) than pigs.  
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[Table 4] 
 
Hierarchical regression analyses were 
conducted in order to assess whether 
speciesism is able to uniquely predict 
participants’ allocations. Demographics 
(gender, age, education, income) were 
entered at Step 1; Social psychological 
discrimination and pro-sociality 
constructs (SDO, empathic concern, 
perspective taking, other-oriented moral 
reasoning, mutual concerns moral 
reasoning, and ableism in the case 
involving mentally severely disabled 
humans) were entered at Step 2; Beliefs 
about suffering capability and intelligence 
of the respective two entities per case 
were entered at Step 3; Speciesism was 
entered at Step 4.  
Tests of collinearity indicated that 
multicollinearity was not a concern (all 
variance inflation factors (VIF) were 
below 2.7). The analyses revealed that 
speciesism was able to predict the amount 
of allocations in all three cases 
significantly above and beyond 
demographic, discrimination and pro-
sociality measures and perceived 
suffering capability and intelligence. Thus, 
despite the fact that people with high 
scores on speciesism believed animals’ 
suffering capability and intelligence were 
reduced, speciesism significantly 
predicted allocations above and beyond 
these beliefs (Table 5). 
 
[Table 5] 
 
Discussion 
In Study 4, we looked at whether 
speciesist attitudes translate into decisions 
about donation allocations. On average, 
participants allocated higher donations to 
a) a charity focusing on helping humans 
than to a charity focusing on helping 
animals; b) a charity focusing on helping 
mentally severely disabled humans than 
to a charity focusing on helping 
chimpanzees; and c) a charity focusing on 
helping dogs than to a charity focusing on 
helping pigs. Speciesism was able to 
explain these allocation decisions above 
and beyond demographic measures; 
discrimination and pro-sociality measures 
(including SDO and empathic concern); 
and measures of explicit beliefs about 
suffering capability and intelligence. We 
conclude that speciesism makes a unique 
contribution to our understanding of how 
people judge and treat individuals of 
different species over established social 
and psychological constructs. It uniquely 
captures an important but neglected 
aspect of discrimination and pro-sociality. 
These findings further demonstrate the 
(philosophical) content validity of the 
Speciesism scale. The psychological 
construct that the Speciesism Scale 
measures reliably predicts all major 
aspects of speciesism in our society as 
defined in philosophy. 
People who displayed speciesist 
attitudes were more likely to believe that 
animals have a reduced capability to 
suffer (particularly animals of “inferior” 
species) as well as have lower intelligence. 
This is consistent with studies that have 
found people tend to ‘de-mentalize’ 
animals classified as food (Bastian, 
Loughnan, Haslam & Radk, 2012) and 
that the extent of moral value they 
attribute to animals is related to the 
animal’s degree of intelligence and 
sentience (Piazza & Loughnan, 2016). Our 
study, however, did not investigate the 
causal direction of this association. It 
could be that speciesism drives people to 
attribute lower mental capabilities to 
animals or that lower attributed mental 
capabilities drive speciesism. In the 
present study, people’s explicit beliefs of 
the ability to suffer and the level of 
intelligence did explain their donation 
allocations to some extent. However, 
speciesism was able to explain it above 
and beyond these beliefs in all three cases.  
An interesting finding was that our study 
showed that in some cases people morally 
value individuals of certain species less 
THE MORAL STANDING OF ANIMALS   Page 22 
   
Caviola, Everett, & Faber (2018)  Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 
than others even when knowing that the 
former (e.g. chimpanzees) are more 
intelligent and more sentient than the 
latter (e.g. mentally severely disabled 
humans). These findings confirm our 
hypothesis that the differential treatment 
of animals is not motivated by people’s 
explicit beliefs about sentience and 
perceived intelligence alone; it is at least 
in parts motivated by speciesism. 
It is important to note that participants 
in our study were explicitly asked to rate 
the suffering capability and level of 
intelligence as biologically accurate as 
possible. In real life settings, in contrast, 
motivated reasoning can distort these 
beliefs — as demonstrated, for example, 
by studies investigating the meat paradox 
(Bastian & Loughnan, 2017). People’s 
perceptions of these mental properties are 
thus very flexible and depend on the 
context and motivational incentives. As 
such, even though our study 
demonstrates that differential treatment of 
individuals of different species cannot be 
fully explained by people’s explicit and 
accuracy-motivated beliefs about the their 
mental capabilities, it is still possible that 
people’s intuitive and biased perceptions 
significantly drive this tendency.  
A possible criticism of the study is that 
even though participants were aware of 
the fact that their decisions were not just 
merely hypothetical, they did not have to 
invest personal resources in order to help 
the respective individuals. Instead, they 
decided how to allocate the available 
resources of the experimenter. In this 
light, their responses are better described 
as resource allocation or decision-making, 
but not necessarily as truly behavioral. In 
the next study, we aimed to address this 
issue by relying on a response technique, 
which required participants to invest their 
personal resources. 
 
Study 5. Helping via Time 
Investment and Food choice 
In Study 4, we demonstrated that 
speciesism predicts decision-making 
about donation allocations above and 
beyond other related psychological 
constructs. We conducted Study 5 with 
three purposes in mind. First and 
foremost, we aimed to replicate the 
finding that speciesism is able to predict 
helping. Second, instead of decisions 
regarding allocations of donations, we 
instead asked participants in this study 
whether they would invest their personal 
time to help individuals, and we explored 
whether speciesism predicts food choices. 
In doing so we introduce measures that 
are clearly behavioral. Third, we aimed to 
confirm that speciesism was able to 
predict real-world behavior in an offline, 
university context relying on a student 
sample.  
In this study, we asked participants to 
read promotional material from a charity 
and asked for their feedback on how it 
could be improved. Each participant had 
to choose from two charities; one focused 
on helping animals and the other on 
helping humans. We hypothesized that 
participants scoring low on speciesism 
would be more likely to invest time in the 
animal charity. We further hypothesized 
that speciesism would be able to predict 
which charity participants helped above 
and beyond social dominance orientation, 
empathic concern, perceived suffering 
capability and intelligence of the type of 
individuals, and demographic data.  
We also included an exploratory test 
related to food choices. At the end of the 
study, participants could choose either a 
meat snack or a vegetarian snack as an 
additional reward for participating in the 
study. Based on our findings from the 
previous studies showing that speciesism 
correlates negatively with ethical 
vegetarianism we hypothesized that those 
participants scoring high in speciesism 
would be more likely to choose the meat 
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snack. This exploratory test can be seen as 
a proxy for meat consumption but it 
should be interpreted with caution as we 
measured food choice at a certain point in 
time only, not general meat consumption. 
Method 
Participants 
102 students from a British university 
took part in the study and received a 
payment of £5 for their participation. 
Three participants were excluded for 
failing an attention check, leaving a final 
sample of 99 students (55 female; Mage = 
25.52, SD = 4.88). This sample size meets 
the recommendation by Long (1997), who 
suggests that a minimum sample of 100 
should be considered for logistic 
regression, and our sample size is 
comparable to work by Crimston et al. 
(2016), who conducted a structurally very 
similar study to ours and recruited the 
same number of participants as we did. 
Materials and Procedure 
Participants completed the study in 
“paper & pencil” form. They first read a 
general information sheet and signed a 
consent form. They then completed the 
Speciesism Scale, SDO scale, and 
Empathic Concern scale. Next, they were 
asked to indicate their beliefs in the 
intelligence and suffering capability of 
humans, chimpanzees and dogs. And 
finally, participants responded to 
demographic questions (age, gender, and 
study subject). 
Our method for measuring 
participants’ willingness to invest time to 
help a certain cause was inspired by 
Crimston et al. (2016). On a further sheet, 
participants were given instructions about 
a seemingly unrelated task. Participants 
were informed that they should provide 
feedback to one of two non-profit 
organizations (from now on referred to as 
charity) on how to improve their 
campaigns. They were told that both 
charities were specifically seeking 
feedback from students.  
The two charities were described as 
follows:  
The Nonhuman Rights project: The 
Nonhuman Rights Project, an 
organization working towards achieving 
actual legal rights for chimpanzees. 
Homeless Shelters: Homeless Shelters, 
an organization providing temporary 
residence for people who can no longer 
afford to pay rent themselves. 
Participants were presented with two 
sealed envelopes labeled with the 
respective names of the charities. 
Promotional material from the charities 
was contained inside the envelope. 
Participants were instructed to open one 
envelope only, and to provide written 
feedback about the campaign. Participants 
were told that their feedback would be 
forwarded to the charity of their choice. 
At the end of the study, after receiving 
the payment, participants were offered a 
snack as an additional reward. They were 
presented with two meat options (beef 
jerky, pork crackling) and two vegetarian 
options that clearly did not include any 
animal products (salted peanuts, rice 
crackers) and were asked to choose one. 
Results 
As predicted, participants who chose 
to invest their time to help the animal 
charity (Non-Human Rights Project) 
scored significantly lower on speciesism 
(N = 33, M = 2.73, SD = .96) than those 
who chose the human charity (Homeless 
Shelters) (N = 66, M = 3.31, SD = .83), t(97) 
= -3.16, p = .002. However, participants 
who chose to help Homeless Shelters 
scored higher on empathic concern (M = 
5.58, SD = .75) and lower on SDO (M = 
2.14, SD = 1.04) than participants who 
chose the animal charity (empathic 
concern: M = 5.18, SD = .89 t(97) = -2.32, p 
= .02, SDO: M = 2.72, SD = .89 t(97) = 2.76; 
p = .01). Notably, SDO was left skewed 
and therefore not normally distributed. 
Hierarchical logistic regression 
analyses were conducted in order to 
assess whether speciesism was able to 
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predict participants’ choice of the charity 
above and beyond the other measures. 
Demographics (gender, age, study subject) 
were entered at Step 1; SDO and empathic 
concern were entered at Step 2; Beliefs 
about suffering capability and intelligence 
of chimpanzees and humans were entered 
at Step 3; Speciesism was entered at Step 
4. The analyses revealed that speciesism 
was able to predict participants’ time-
investment choices significantly above 
and beyond all other factors listed. Results 
are shown in Table 6. 
 
[Table 6] 
 
Further, participants who chose the 
meat snack (N = 26, M = 3.47, SD = .90) 
scored also significantly higher on 
speciesism than participants who chose 
the vegetarian snack (N = 72, M = 2.98, SD 
= .88), t(96) = -2.40, p = .018. Hierarchical 
logistic regression analysis predicting the 
snack participants chose analogously to 
the above analysis was close to being 
significant, R2 = .23, p = .07.  
Discussion 
This study demonstrated that 
speciesism is able to predict how people 
will invest their time when faced with a 
choice between helping animals or 
humans. After controlling for 
demographics, empathic concern, SDO, 
and beliefs about suffering capability and 
intelligence of humans and chimpanzees, 
each one-point increase in speciesism 
increased the likelihood of people 
choosing to help the human charity by 
195%. Significant results supporting this 
finding were also found in an online pilot 
study (N = 51) we conducted prior to the 
student sample study.  
Interestingly, people who chose the 
animal charity showed less empathic 
concern than people who chose the 
human charity. Empathic concern, 
therefore, seems to be a stronger predictor 
for helpful behavior towards humans than 
towards animals (when one is only faced 
with these two options only). This is in 
spite of the negative correlation between 
speciesism and empathic concern. One 
possible explanation for this result is that 
people feel empathic concern to those who 
are close to them, and people feel more 
closely connected to other humans than to 
animals. Another explanation might be 
that fighting homelessness triggers more 
empathy than establishing animal rights 
because the former is perceived as more 
imminent and more directly tractable than 
the latter.  
Other results were also puzzling at 
first. For example, people who chose to 
help the animal charity also scored higher 
in SDO than people who chose to help the 
human charity. At first glance, this 
appears inconsistent with our previous 
findings. However, we should be cautious 
to attribute much weight to this result, as 
SDO was strongly left skewed in the 
university student sample. In contrast, in 
the online pilot study SDO and empathic 
concern were normally distributed and no 
correlations between the charity chosen 
and SDO and empathic concern were 
revealed. 
This study further demonstrated that 
speciesism can predict real-world food 
choices. The lower people scored on 
speciesism, the more likely they were to 
choose the vegetarian snack. This finding 
confirms the result of the online pilot 
study in which participants were asked a 
hypothetical question about what food 
they would choose. The food-choice 
element of the study was exploratory, and 
there were many other factors that could 
have affected participants’ choice of snack. 
These might include the social demand 
effect, different tastes, and the time of day, 
among others. A further limitation of this 
study was that we did not control for 
vegetarianism. Due to the relation 
between speciesism and vegetarianism, it 
is not clear to which extent food choices 
were driven by speciesism versus 
vegetarianism. However, given that only 
6% of US participants of Study 1 indicated 
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that they were vegetarian, and recent polls 
suggest only 2% of the British public is 
consistently vegetarian (Bates et al., 2014), 
only little variance in food choices could 
have been explained by vegetarianism 
alone. Given that 74% of our participants 
chose the vegetarian snack, yet estimates 
suggest only a small fraction of the 
population to be vegetarian, it seems clear 
that many non-vegetarians must have 
chosen the vegetarian snack and there are 
many reasons for why this might be—
lower scores in speciesism is likely to be 
one of them. Future research can 
hopefully shed more light on the relation 
of speciesism, vegetarianism, carnism, and 
actual food choices.  
A general methodological limitation of 
the study is the possibility that demand 
effects or consistency motives could have 
driven the correlation between responses 
to the scale and responses to the tasks. 
Participants might have guessed what the 
aim of the study was after responding to 
the scale and might have been motivated 
to remain consistent in the next task. 
Future studies could attempt to alleviate 
this problem by trying to obfuscate the 
purpose of the study, introducing time 
delays between the tasks, or by other 
means. 
 
General Discussion 
Throughout its history, speciesism has 
been a concept largely confined to 
philosophy. Ultimately, however, 
speciesism is a hypothesis about human 
psychology; it is the assumption that 
people morally discriminate against 
individuals on the basis of their species 
membership. The purpose of this paper is 
to transition speciesism from a 
philosophical hypothesis to a matter of 
empirical psychological investigation. 
These investigations have only just begun 
in recent years and with this paper we 
make the following four contributions to 
that transition.  
First, we describe the philosophy of 
speciesism and introduce it as a 
psychological phenomenon, suitable for 
empirical investigation. Speciesism has 
been purported to be a reliable form of 
prejudice analogous to racism and sexism, 
and yet the empirical claims behind this 
have received little attention so far. 
Second, we present the Speciesism 
Scale: A theoretically driven and 
empirically validated explicit measure of 
speciesism with high internal consistency 
and test-retest reliability. This scale 
confirms that speciesism is an accurately 
measurable, stable form of prejudice with 
high interpersonal differences. 
Third, we demonstrate that, as 
originally proposed by philosophers, 
speciesism can be considered a form of 
prejudice. We have found that speciesism 
is psychologically related to human-
human types of prejudice such as racism, 
sexism, and homophobia. This is 
consistent with the generalized prejudice 
theory, which assumes that prejudice 
towards various targets is significantly 
correlated and can be explained by an 
underlying generalized prejudice factor 
(Akrami, Ekehammer, & Bergh, 2011). 
Our finding that speciesism is strongly 
related to SDO confirms the SD-HARM 
model (Dhont et al., 2014), which assumes 
that speciesism and human-human types 
of prejudice are underpinned by the same 
socio-ideological beliefs, namely a general 
endorsement of social hierarchy and 
inequality. The fact that speciesism shares 
these psychological properties with other 
phenomena we refer to as prejudice seems 
to strengthen the case that speciesism can 
be referred to as prejudice as well. We 
note that in comparison to human-human 
forms of prejudice, speciesism is the 
dominant and explicitly accepted social 
norm and ideology in current Western 
societies. Consequently, people who 
endorse the current status quo and people 
on the political right tend to score high on 
speciesism, whereas actively open-
minded thinking seems to facilitate 
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questioning that norm. We also identified 
lower levels of empathic concern as an 
additional factor associated with 
speciesism. 
Fourth, we demonstrate that 
speciesism can predict behavior above 
and beyond existing constructs. In doing 
so, we believe we are the first to 
systematically show effects of speciesist 
attitudes on actual, observable behavior. 
In two studies we found that speciesism 
predicts people’s willingness to help 
humans and “superior” animals such as 
dogs (rather than “inferior” animals such 
as pigs), in terms of allocating donation 
money and investing time. We also found 
that speciesism predicts people’s (meat vs. 
vegetarian) food choices. This indicates 
that speciesism captures an important but 
neglected aspect of both discrimination 
and prosociality.  
Limitations and future research 
Our investigation of speciesism 
focused on the general tendency to 
morally discriminate between individuals 
on the basis of their species membership. 
However, we did not explicitly analyze 
how this occurs. It is possible that—in line 
with research on stereotypes and social 
categorizations (Haslam, 1997)—people 
place individuals of certain species into 
different categories such as food, pets, 
entertainment, equipment, pest, wild 
animals, humans, etc. These culturally and 
historically contingent categories might 
define the general connotation, 
perceptions, values, and common 
properties associated with their 
individuals. For example, animals in the 
food category (e.g. cows) seem to be 
associated with low moral value as well as 
perceptions of low mental capabilities. 
Animals of the pest category (e.g. rats) 
seem furthermore to be associated with 
disgust-eliciting characteristics such as 
being dirty. The categories ultimately 
define (or are defined by) how we relate 
to the respective individuals. And while 
usually whole species are placed into 
certain categories (i.e. speciesism), 
exceptions can be made; for instance, 
one’s personal pet pig will be placed into 
a different category than all other pigs. 
Future research will hopefully further 
investigate the specifics of the different 
kinds of categories that speciesism seems 
to rely on. 
Similarly, more research is needed to 
understand the cognitive mechanisms that 
facilitate speciesist attitudes and practices. 
In this regard, it is likely that the 
psychological process of moral 
disengagement (Bandura, 1999) plays a 
critical role. Bandura’s theory of moral 
disengagement proposes that cognitive 
restructuring mechanisms allow us to 
view inhumane practices as benign by 
disabling moral self-condemnation. These 
mechanisms may include moral 
justification, euphemistic language, 
displacement of responsibility, 
dehumanization, and a disregard for the 
victims’ suffering. Moral disengagement 
theory has not yet been applied to 
speciesism, but it is a plausible 
explanation for tolerating practices such 
as factory farming (Graça, Calheiros, & 
Oliveira, 2016).  
Moral philosophers have reasoned 
that anti-speciesists are morally compelled 
to adopt ethical vegetarianism (Singer, 
1975; 1979). Descriptively, however, we 
have found that empirically this is not 
always the case. People do not 
consistently bridge the gap between 
caring about animals and consuming 
animal products (i.e. meat paradox). Our 
results from Studies 1 and 3 suggest that 
speciesism and ethical vegetarianism are 
psychologically distinct to some extent. 
Overall, however, the two are strongly 
linked and indeed as Study 5 suggests 
speciesism predicts whether people 
choose to eat meat or a vegetarian option. 
Carnism has been suggested as a major 
ideological driver of the continuation of 
meat consumption in our society 
(Monteiro et al., 2017). Future studies in 
this area will now be able to use the 
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Speciesism Scale to investigate the 
relations and causal mechanisms between 
speciesism, carnism and the meat paradox 
with greater rigor and accuracy.  
Further research is needed on how 
speciesism varies between cultures. Amiot 
and Bastian (2015) have summarized 
existing studies that may help to point the 
way. Their work focused on cross-cultural 
attitudes towards animals. They found, 
for example, that attitudes towards pet 
keeping vary strongly between cultures. 
In order for the Speciesism Scale to 
facilitate cross-cultural research, however, 
it might need to be adapted for cultures 
where certain animals are categorized 
differently to Western norms.  
Many more avenues for future 
research are yet to be discovered. Despite 
the apparent ubiquity of speciesism in our 
every-day lives and despite the fact that 
speciesism is a well-known phenomenon 
to philosophers, speciesism is hugely 
under-investigated in the field of social, 
personality, and moral psychology. We 
hope that this paper can transfer some of 
the energy with which psychology has 
pursued human-human discrimination 
onto the so far neglected area of human-
animal discrimination.  
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Table 1 
Factor loadings from the second EFA (Study 1) 
Item Item Label Factor 1 Factor 2 
1* Humans have the right to use animals however they want to. .742  
2* It is morally acceptable to keep animals in circuses for human entertainment. .701  
3 It is morally acceptable to kill animals, because they are less intelligent than humans. .682  
4* It is morally acceptable to hunt animals for sport. .665  
5* Morally, animals always count for less than humans. .638  
6* It is morally acceptable to do cosmetic research on animals. .631  
7* Some beings are morally more important than others just because they belong to a certain species. .602  
8 A pig has a lower capacity to suffer than a human baby. .598  
9* It is morally acceptable to perform medical experiments on animals that we would not perform on any human. .597  
10 A pig has a lower capacity to suffer than a dog. .585  
11 It is morally acceptable to kill animals even it is not necessary for our own survival. .582  
12* Basic rights that are enjoyed by humans – like protection from harm – should also be granted to animals. -.582  
13 Reducing pain and suffering in animals is morally equally important as reducing pain and suffering in humans. -.577  
14 It is morally acceptable to breed animals just to produce leather out of their skin. .560  
15* It is morally acceptable to trade animals like possessions. .545  
16 
If an elephant hurts itself in nature, it is morally acceptable not to 
help even if it were morally required to help a human in the same 
situation. 
.532  
17* Chimpanzees should have basic legal rights such as a right to life or a prohibition of torture. -.527  
18 It is morally acceptable to kill animals that destroy human property, for example, rats, mice, or pigeons. .502  
19 It is morally worse to kill any human than to kill a chimpanzee. .485  
20 Factory farming of animals is morally wrong. -.397  
21 Pigs should be taken care of by humans just like dogs are. -.373  
22 Faced with a decision of killing one human embryo or one pig, we should always kill the pig. .365  
23† It is morally wrong to eat fish.  .820 
24† It is morally wrong to consume milk and eggs.  .743 
25† It is morally required to become vegetarian in an effort to save animals.  .648 
26† It is morally acceptable for cattle and pigs to be raised for human consumption.  -.529 
27† It is morally acceptable to hunt wild animals for food.  -.528 
 
Notes. * included in CFA’s first factor, † included in CFA’s second factor 
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Table 2 
Speciesism Scale 
 
Item Item Label 
1 Morally, animals always count for less than humans. 
2 Humans have the right to use animals however they want to. 
3 It is morally acceptable to keep animals in circuses for human entertainment. 
4 It is morally acceptable to trade animals like possessions. 
5 Chimpanzees should have basic legal rights such as a right to life or a prohibition of torture. (r) 
6 It is morally acceptable to perform medical experiments on animals that we would not perform on any human. 
 
Notes. Answers on a 7-point scale from "Strongly disagree" to "Strongly agree". (r) indicates reversed 
scoring. 
 
Table 3 
Correlations between speciesism and other constructs as well as partial correlations (pr) when controlled for 
SDO (Study 4) 
 
 
 
Notes. Degrees of freedom were 243. † p < .10.  * p < .05.  ** p < .01.   *** p < .001. Bonferroni adjusted 
alpha level was .006. 
  
Constructs r pr 
Social Dominance Orientation .42***  
Racism .32*** .01 
Sexism .41*** .20** 
Homophobia .17** .04 
Conservatism .25*** .07 
System Justification .25*** .15† 
Right-Wing Authoritarianism .14* -.08 
Empathic Concern -.46*** -.31*** 
Actively Open-Minded Thinking -.17* .05 
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Table 4 
Beliefs about intelligence and suffering capability (ratings on a scale from 0 to 100) and correlations of these 
beliefs with speciesism (Study 4) 
 
 Beliefs in M (SD) Correlation with speciesism 
Species Intelligence Suffering capability Intelligence 
Suffering 
capability 
Humans 87.79 (12.88) 96.88 (6.82) -.04 -.15 
Animals 39.71 (19.71) 84.20 (20.39) -.27*** -.29*** 
Mentally severely disabled 
humans 54.14 (26.44) 89.96 (15.31) 0.6 -.10 
Chimpanzees 66.84 (22.61) 91.92 (13.37) -.20* -.25** 
Dogs 55.09 (21.25) 91.33 (12.34) -.18* -.28*** 
Pigs 51.43 (25.70) 87.07 (18.38) -.23** -.29*** 
 
Notes. * p < .05.  ** p < .01.   *** p < .001. 
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Table 5 
Hierarchical regression predicting donation allocations to “superior” individuals (humans, mentally severely disabled humans, dogs) vs. “inferior” individuals 
(animals, chimpanzees, pigs), displaying the standardized coefficients (beta) (Study 4) 
 Humans vs. Animals Mentally Severely Disabled Humans vs. Chimpanzees  Dogs vs. pigs 
Predictor measures Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 
∆R2 .02 .04 .11** .17*** .03 .04 .17*** .07*** .01 .05 .04 .07** 
Gender -.01 -.03 -.14 -.15† .06 .02 .16 .17† .05 .03 .03 .01 
Age -.10 -.13 -.09 -.03 .12 .13 .08 .04 -.07 -.09 -.07 -.01 
Education .03 .03 .03 .08 .12 .12 .12 .09 .02 .03 .00 .04 
Income .05 .06 .04 .00 -.06 -.08 -.13 -.09 -.07 -.07 -.07 -.10 
SDO  -.08 .04 .06  .02 .03 -.08  -.15 -.13 -.01 
Empathic concern  .07 -.11 -.06  .00 .05 .12  .14 .06 -.01 
Perspective taking  -.14 .04 -.01  .19 .21† .14  .12 .15 .22† 
Other-oriented  -.08 -.11 -.13  .03 .04 .08  -.11 -.13 -.18 
Mutual concern  .23† -.07 .21†  -.08 -.14 -.14  -.11 -.06 -.07 
Ableism      .12 .04 .05     
Suffering “superior”   .05 .04   .18† .17†   -.43* -.43* 
Suffering “inferior”   .14 .06   -.21* -.18†   .47* .42* 
Intelligence “superior”   -.26* -.21*   .29** .25**   .02 -.01 
Intelligence “inferior”   .25** .13   -.27** -.22*   .05 .01 
Speciesism    -.46***    .30***    -.27*** 
             
 
Notes. † p < .10.  * p < .05.  ** p < .01.   *** p < .001. 
Table 6 
Hierarchical logistic regression predicting whether participants chose the human or animal charity, displaying 
Exp(B) (Study 5) 
 
Predictor measures Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 
R2 .00 .09* .11 .23*** 
Gender 1.04 .85 .99 1.23 
Age 1.02 1.01 1.01 1.02 
SDO  .64† .64† .62† 
Empathic concern  1.58 1.69† 1.97† 
Suffering humans   1.00 1.01 
Suffering chimpanzees   .996 1.00 
Intelligence humans   1.02 1.00 
Intelligence chimpanzees   .98 .99 
Speciesism    3.43** 
 
Notes. † p < .10.  * p < .05.  ** p < .01.   *** p < .001. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Average donation allocations to the charities (Study 4). In all three scenarios allocations 
significantly differed from an equal distribution of 50 donation points each. Error bars represent 
standard errors of the mean. 
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Appendix 
Speciesism Scale 
 
1. Morally, animals always count for less than humans. 
2. Humans have the right to use animals however they want to. 
3. It is morally acceptable to keep animals in circuses for human entertainment. 
4. It is morally acceptable to trade animals like possessions. 
5. Chimpanzees should have basic legal rights such as a right to life or a prohibition of torture. 
(r) 
6. It is morally acceptable to perform medical experiments on animals that we would not 
perform on any human. 
 
Participants answer on 7-point scale from “Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”. The fifth item 
(labelled with ‘r’, indicates reversed scoring). After reverse-coding this item, scores should be 
averaged together to create an overall mean score of speciesism 
